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HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN WRONGS: IS
THE UNITED STATES DEATH PENALTY
SYSTEM INCONSISTENT WITH
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW?1
Warren Allmand, Stephen B. Bright, Rubin "Hurricane" Carter,
Dorean Marguerite Koenig, William A. Schabas, and W. L. Seriti
PROFESSOR KOENIG:2
If we go back to our roots, there are roots of abolition in this coun-
try that we have lost and we have forgotten. Michigan and Wisconsin
abolished the death penalty in the 1800s and have not brought it back.
In Pennsylvania, you will find that in the eighteenth century the work
of Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, had great influence.
It advocated moderation in punishment and called for an end to capi-
tal punishment.3 Beccaria believed that harsh punishments would
teach people to act violently.4 The reason we have degrees of murder
in the United States is that there was a movement to limit the death
penalty in Pennsylvania, and Beccaria influenced it. Those are our
roots. I think we have forgotten them, and that we have to find them
again.
The ABA Resolution for a moratorium on executions is a call to
action. In this meeting today we want to bring together the work that
is happening on the ABA moratorium and the work that the people
like Steve Bright do-the everyday work in the trenches of trying to
fight back this horrible blight of executions. We want to combine this
with the very effective worldwide movement towards abolishment that
has resulted, to date, in over half the countries of the world no longer
effectively having a death penalty.
A dozen years ago, I was told I was going to die. I saw a surgeon
and was told I needed surgery. I was really tough. I figured I could
know anything, so I said, "How long do you think I have to live?" and
1. These were the panelists' opening remarks at the 1998 ABA Annual Meeting
of the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, held in Toronto, Canada, on
August 3, 1998.
2. Professor Dorean Marguerite Koenig is a Professor of Law at the Thomas M.
Cooley Law School in Lansing, Michigan, where she teaches criminal and constitu-
tional law and has engaged students in work on the death penalty, including litigation
on death penalty cases. Professor Koenig works with the Michigan Coalition oppos-
ing capital punishment and has testified before the Michigan Legislature in opposition
to various bills that would institute the death penalty in Michigan.
3. See Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishment 42-52 (Bobbs-Merrill Co.
1963) (1764).
4. See id. at 43-44.
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"What will it be like?" He said, "I predict you have about six months
to live and it is going to be a horrible death." He then went on to
describe exactly how I was going to die and how horrible it would be.
The first thing I did was to get another doctor. Of course, the first
doctor was wrong in his prediction.
But in the very, very dark days that followed my discussion with the
first doctor, I learned two things about myself. The first was the
unique value of life to the individual. I did not want to lose my life. I
really, really did not want to lose my life, and the preciousness of that
life just took on new meaning to me. I thought about that and I
thought about how everybody's life is of unique and precious value to
them. The second thing I learned is that I looked through my life and
thought, "What have I done that has any redemptive value to it?" It
was great, great comfort to me that I had been part of a wonderful
team with Deval Patrick and Skip Babbs and others who had saved
the life of Carl Songer, a death row inmate in Florida.
Carl had come down from Oklahoma, and he had shot a policeman
who had young children. Carl was sleeping by the side of the road in
his car, and the policeman woke him up, and they both shot their
guns. It was a terrible crime. Carl's parents traveled from Norman,
Oklahoma down to Florida to be with him during the trial. Carl's
attorney, before the sentencing phase began, turned to them and said,
"You might as well go home. They're not going to allow you to testify,
because that's not the sort of thing that will be allowed into the record
or influence the jury." So, they very reluctantly went home.
I thought Carl's habeas corpus case was a real winner. The judge
himself, during our successive habeas hearings, admitted on the record
that he had applied a wrong standard in sentencing Carl Songer to
death and that wrong standard was one of the reasons why Carl's par-
ents had been told to go home. I found out during that time how very,
very difficult death penalty cases are and how very much they are dif-
ferent. They are not ordinary cases. They are politically motivated
cases in which judges are very frightened to make the determination
that is necessary in the case. The public has very strong feelings about
death penalty cases but very little information about them.
With Carl Songer we came right up to the point of death. He was to
be executed at seven in the morning. It was about four in the after-
noon of the day before, and we were waiting for the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals three-judge panel to decide what it was going to do.
The result was that we got a one-day stay from the panel at about 4:30
in the afternoon. The next day the Eleventh Circuit decided to hear
the case en banc.i The denial of the habeas corpus petition was unani-
mously overturned.6 I felt very grateful.
5. See Songer v. Wainwright, 758 F.2d 552, 552 (11th Cir. 1995).
6. See Songer v. Wainwright, 769 F.2d 1488, 1488 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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I feel a great deal of sympathy for those whose job in the trenches
ends in the death of clients. I think that it very frequently does be-
cause of the standards for implementing the death penalty that apply
today. One of my students is going to be working in Kentucky on
death penalty cases. One of the defendants there is Kevin Stanford,
who was seventeen when he was charged with committing murder,
was convicted, and sentenced to death.7
I have learned a lot from Bill Schabas, who is here today. He says
that the United States and the Cook Islands are the only countries
that have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which prohibits the execution of children who were under the age of
eighteen when the crime was committed. We join the countries of
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen as the only countries in the
world that allow the execution of juveniles-people who are almost
certainly immature when they commit their crimes.s
I want to discuss some of the things that happened in 1997 that are
very important in showing the worldwide movement towards abolition
of the death penalty. First, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on
October 2, 1997. As President Jacques Santer said, "The Treaty un-
derpins the abolition of the death penalty in all European Union
member states." In that treaty they adopted the text of the Declara-
tion on Abolition of the Death Penalty. We can expect to see the
number of countries in the European Union expand in the next com-
ing years; they are all going to have to abolish the death penalty
before they will be allowed to join the European Union.
Second, the Council of Europe now has over 800 million citizens
within its ambit. The abolition of the death penalty was put at the top
of the list of its priorities in 1997. It is calling for universal abolition of
the death penalty.
Third, in March and April of 1997, the United Nations Human
Rights Commission passed its first resolution condemning capital pun-
ishment. It called on all countries to suspend executions. The United
States was the only western nation voting against that resolution. It
indicates, unfortunately, that we are becoming isolated from the rest
of the world.
Fourth, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has reviewed
the report of the United States on the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. One of the main points of contention the Committee had with
the United States concerned the death penalty. The Committee said
this posed a most serious problem, placing the United States out of
compliance with the Covenant, which, as you know, the Senate rati-
fied and is binding law in the United States. The Committee based its
conclusion that the United States was out of compliance mainly on the
7. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 366 (1989).
8. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
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excessive number of offenses subject to the death penalty and the
number of death sentences imposed. It also looked at the long stays
on death row and the lack of protection from the death penalty for
children and the mentally retarded.
Bacre Waly Ndiaye, who was the United Nations Special Rap-
porteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, prepared
a report released earlier this year, after investigating the United States
death penalty last year. In his report, he listed a number of violations
of universal human rights that the United States is engaging in.
At this point, I would like to present our first speaker, Stephen
Bright.
MR. BRIGHT:9
The United States has over 3500 people under sentence of death."
The states have executed over 500 people in the last twenty years-
seventy-four of them in 1997."1 In some states, such as Texas and Vir-
ginia, executions have become routine. Texas, at the start of this year,
had carried out 166 executions in the last twenty years.'2 One county
in Texas-Harris County, which includes Houston-is responsible for
more executions than any state except Texas. 3 Virginia comes in sec-
ond with over 50 executions over the past 20 years. 4 It is troubling
that only a few people pay attention to what is happening when peo-
ple are executed in Virginia, in Texas, and in many other states now
that so many people have been put to death. That is why meetings
like this are so important.
The growing use of the death penalty in the United States is con-
trary to the trend in the rest of the world. The number of countries
that allow the death penalty are now in the minority, and the trend is
certainly towards abolition. Fifty years ago, only eight countries had
9. Stephen B. Bright is the recipient of the ABA's 1998 Thurgood Marshall
Award presented by the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities. Mr. Bright
has served as the Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights in Atlanta,
Georgia, for more than fifteen years. The Center is a public interest law firm that
represents clients in criminal trials, prison civil rights actions, and death penalty cases.
In 1988, Mr. Bright successfully argued Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988), which
resulted in the United States Supreme Court's vacating a conviction and death sen-
tence because of racial discrimination. Mr. Bright also has successfully challenged
improperly imposed death sentences in several other cases.
10. See NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Death Row USA Re-
porter: Current Service 1239 (1998).
11. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Death Penalty Information Center (visited Mar.
25, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpicexec.html> [hereinafter Death Penalty
Information Center].
12. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., State Executions (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://
www.essential.org/dpic/dpicreg.html>.
13. See Armando Villafranca, A Man of Conviction, Houston Chron., Nov. 29,
1998, at Al.
14. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 11.
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abolished the death penalty for all crimes. 5 Today the number is
sixty-three.' 6 Additionally, a total of 103 countries have abolished the
death penalty in law or practice.' 7
A small number of countries account for a large percentage of the
executions which take place in the world every year. Last year, ac-
cording to Amnesty International, forty countries in the world carried
out executions.' 8 But four of those countries-the United States,
China, Iran and Saudi Arabia-accounted for eight-five percent of
those executions that took place.19
The United States leads the world in the execution of children, that
is, people under eighteen at the time crimes have been committed.
Since 1990, only five other countries-Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Nigeria, and Yemen-have executed children.2 0 But none of them has
executed as many children as the United States.21
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child prohib-
its the execution of those who committed crimes when they were
under the age of eighteen. 2 The United States has signed but has not
ratified that convention.' It is difficult for the United States to lec-
ture China on human rights violations when it leads the world in the
execution of children.
Viewed from Europe, Mexico, Australia, and South Africa, execu-
tions in the United States have become growing targets of curiosity
and condemnation. 24 People in those countries have difficulty under-
standing why America retains a punishment that has been abandoned
by their countries and virtually every other western democracy. Yet,
the position of many people in the United States has been to disregard
international opinion, to continue to wage a "war on crime" by ex-
panding the use of the death penalty, and to ignore international law
in doing so. That became a little more difficult during this last year as
it became apparent that the practices of the states in carrying out ex-
15. See Eric Prokosch, Human Rights v. The Death Penalty: Abolition and Restric-
tion in Law and Practice, in Europe: A Death-Penalty-Free Zone (forthcoming 2000)
(manuscript at 1, on file with Fordhant Law Review).
16. See id. (manuscript at 1).
17. See id. (manuscript at 9).
18. See id. (manuscript at 9).
19. See id. (manuscript at 9).
20. See Amnesty Int'l USA, The USA to Confirm its Position as World Leader in
Killing Child Offenders (last modified Jan. 25, 1999) <httpJlwww.amnestyusa.org/
news/1999/25101099.htm>.
21. See id
22. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (noting age limit).
23. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich. L.
Rev. 390, 402 (1998).
24. See Richard Boudreaux, To Italy, A U.S. Convict Symbolized the Crime of
Capital Punishment; L.A. Times, Aug. 17, 1997, at All.
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ecutions could not escape the attention and disapproval of other coun-
tries and international human rights organizations.
Virginia executed a national of Paraguay, Angel Breard, whose trial
and conviction violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions.25 The Convention requires a country that arrests a foreign na-
tional to notify the consul for that person's country.26 Virginia
ignored the requirement in Breard's case-it did not notify the consul
for Paraguay that he had been arrested. The International Court of
Justice at the Hague asked that Breard's execution be stayed until it
could decide whether there had been a violation of international
law .2 But the United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,
denied a stay of execution.' The Solicitor General of the United
States urged the Court to allow the execution. The Court did so.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, wrote the Gov-
ernor of Virginia and asked if he would stop the execution so that the
International Court of Justice could consider the case. He did not,
and Breard was executed.2 9 This is the second time recently in which
Virginia has executed a foreign national in violation of the Vienna
Convention. This is the sort of behavior expected from a rogue na-
tion, but it should not be practiced by one of the United States.
Virginia's cavalier attitude toward its international obligations has a
major impact on the quality of legal representation a foreign national
receives in its courts. The courts of Virginia will assign a poor person
facing the death penalty a lawyer that most people would not want
representing them on a traffic matter, and will pay that lawyer so little
that it is impossible to investigate and prepare the case properly. On
the other hand, in some cases in other states where the consul has
been notified, their governments have hired real lawyers to represent
them. They have avoided the death penalty because the lawyers did
what lawyers are supposed to do: investigate the case, present the
evidence, and have an adversary trial, as opposed to the sort of sum-
mary, perfunctory trial which often results in a death sentence in
Virginia.
Utah's indifference to the danger of racial discrimination in the in-
fliction of the death penalty did not escape the attention of the Inter-
national Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of
American States. The Commission found a number of violations of
the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in the process that
25. See Marcia Coyle, Are 65 Illegally on Death Row in U.S.?, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 27,
1998, at A16.
26. See id.
27. See Brooke A. Masters & Joan Biskupic, Killer Executed Despite Pleas; World
Tribunal, State Department Had Urged Delay, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1998, at B1.
28. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1356 (1998).
29. See Masters & Biskupic, supra note 27.
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led to the execution of William Andrews, an African-American man?'
Andrews and two other African-American men were tried before an
all-white jury in Utah at a time when the Mormon church held the
view that people of color were inferior and would not be admitted to
heaven. All of the African-American citizens in the jury venire were
struck with challenges for cause or peremptory strikes. At one point
during the trial, a juror received a note with a picture of a scaffold and
a stick figure hanging from it, and the words "Hang the Niggers." No
court, state or federal, ever held a hearing on where the note came
from, who wrote it, what the jurors did with it, or what the impact on
the jurors was.31 William Andrews and one of his co-defendants were
put to death.
In addition, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudi-
cial, Summary, and Arbitrary Executions issued a report about the
death penalty in the United States finding racial discrimination, poor
quality of lawyers for people who have the misfortune of having law-
yers appointed by the courts, and the execution of the mentally ill, the
mentally retarded, and children.32 The report echoes the American
Bar Association's call for a moratorium on capital punishment be-
cause of those deficiencies in the process. It also echoes findings
made two years ago by the International Commission of Jurists with
regard to the death penalty in the United States.3 The rest of the
world is watching and is appalled by what it sees.
I recently participated in a debate with the former Attorney Gen-
eral of Georgia, Michael Bowers, a proponent of the death penalty.
In that debate Bowers asked, "Are we going to listen to people from
places like France to decide how we are going to run our court system
here? Are we going to listen to people from Sweden tell us what to
do? from Canada? and Mexico? These people don't understand our
customs. They don't understand our practices."
Of course, when people from outside Georgia questioned the prac-
tice of slavery before the Civil War, the Attorney General of Georgia
at that time would say the same thing-that these "outsiders" did not
understand the customs, the practices, and the peculiar institution of
slavery. During the era of "separate but equal," Georgia responded
30. See Mike Carter, Commission Censures Execution; Hi F Killer's Rights Vio-
lated, Group Says; Commission Censures U.S. For Execution, Salt Lake Trib., Mar. 6,
1998, at B1.
31. See Andrews v. Shulsen, 485 U.S. 919, 922 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari).
32. See Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in
Any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependant
Countries and Territories: Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Erecutions, Report of
the Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 54th Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/68* (1997) [hereinafter Report of the Special
Rapporteur].
33. See International Commission of Jurists, Administration of the Death Penalty
in the United States: Report of a Mission (1996).
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to criticisms about the way it was treating people of color by telling
outsiders not to question its practices, customs, and traditions. From
those experiences, we should have learned that it may be wise to listen
to those from outside who question our practices.
One example of what passes for justice in courts of states that are
sending people to death row, but is shocking to others, is provided by
a trial in Houston, which, as I mentioned, executes more people that
any other jurisdiction in the United States. The Houston Chronicle
carried this account of the trial:
Seated beside his client-a convicted capital murderer-defense at-
torney John Benn spent much of Thursday afternoon's trial in ap-
parent deep sleep.
His mouth kept falling open and his head lolled back on his shoul-
ders, and then he awakened just long enough to catch himself and
sit upright. Then it happened again. And again. And again.
Every time he opened his eyes, a different prosecution witness was
on the stand describing another aspect of the [case against his cli-
ent], George McFarland ....
When [the judge] finally called a recess, Benn was asked if he truly
had fallen asleep [when he was supposed to be defending a man in]
a capital murder trial.
"It's boring," the 72-year-old, longtime Houston lawyer explained.34
When Judge Doug Shaver, who was presiding, was asked how he
could preside over a case where the lawyer was sleeping during the
trial, the judge responded that the Constitution guarantees a lawyer,
but it does not guarantee that the lawyer will be awake.35 Judge
Shaver must be a strict constructionist.
His comments would be amusing and perhaps laughed off as an ab-
erration except that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld
George McFarland's conviction and death sentence.36 The majority
actually went so far as to say that perhaps-although there is no evi-
dence of this-the lawyer decided to sleep during the trial as a strat-
egy to get sympathy for his client.37
Even more troubling is that George McFarland's case is only one of
three cases tried in Houston, the capital of capital punishment, in
which the defense lawyer has slept during the capital trial. Both Cal-
vin Burdine and Carl Johnson were represented by Joe Cannon, a
man who's known to try cases, as he says, "like greased lightning,"
who does not bother the court by filing a lot of motions or making
objections, and who has the distinction of having more people under
34. John Makeig, Asleep on the Job?: Slaying Trial Boring, Lawyer Says, Houston
Chron., Aug. 14, 1992, at A35.
35. See id.
36. See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
37. See id at 505 n.20.
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death sentence than any other lawyer in Houston.' In both of those
cases, there was testimony by the clerk of the court, jurors, and other
people that Mr. Cannon was sleeping at times during the trial. Calvin
Burdine's case was just upheld in Ex Parte Burdine;39 the court said a
sleeping lawyer did not violate the right to counsel.4 0
In Carl Johnson's case, neither the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
nor the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had the
courage to publish its opinion. It is hard to blame them. That case is
something to be ashamed of. Both upheld Carl Johnson's conviction
and sentence, even though his lawyer slept during his trial, and John-
son was put to death just two years ago.'
I recently handled a case in Georgia in which I was examining the
lawyer who tried the case. Much like Mr. Benn, he was an old-time
lawyer who took court appointments to defend poor people for token
amounts of money because that was the only business he could get.
He was a Georgia lawyer, and he represented my client in a Georgia
trial. At some point during my examination of him, I mentioned the
case of Gregg v. Georgia.42 That was the case that upheld Georgia's
death penalty statute in 1976,13 after the death penalty had been de-
clared unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia." A lawyer trying a
death case in Georgia should be familiar with the Gregg decision,
which is the basic starting point of modern capital punishment law.
Yet, it became clear that the lawyer had never heard of the Gregg
case. When asked if he knew the case, he answered that he did not.
When asked about Furman v. Georgia, he answered that he had never
heard of it either. I asked him about several other landmark cases on
capital punishment-cases that any lawyer defending a case ought to
know-and he had never heard of any of them. Finally, I asked if he
could just tell me any case from any court with which he was familiar.
He thought about it for a long time and finally said he could not name
a case. I thought that he would surely say Miranda v. Arizona.45 Any-
one who watches television or reads the newspapers has heard of the
Miranda case. But this gentleman had not.
38. Paul M. Barrett, Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About
System, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at Al.
39. 901 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).
40. But see id. at 457 & n.1 (Maloney, J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of clerk of
court that "defense counsel was asleep on several occasions on several days over the
course of the proceedings" and "was asleep for long periods of time during the ques-
tioning of witnesses").
41. See David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalo , and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L
Rev. 691, 694-95 (1996) (describing case of Carl Johnson, who was executed by Texas
even though his lawyer slept through much of proceedings).
42. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
43. See id. at 207.
44. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
45. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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I asked him if he had ever used an expert witness in his entire prac-
tice. It certainly would have been good if he had used one in the case
of my client. The defense was that what occurred was an accident.
All the lawyer did was cross-examine the person from the state crime
laboratory about how the gun fired. What the lawyer did not know
and the state's expert did not tell him was that the gun had a design
defect which caused it to fire accidentally. The manufacturer of the
gun had changed the design of the gun in later models in order to
correct this defect. The jury never had this critical information.
When asked if he had ever used an expert, the lawyer thought about
it for a long time and finally said he might once have used a doctor.
When asked if he had ever had an investigator during his entire forty-
year career at the bar, the lawyer said he had never employed the
services of an investigator. Indeed, in Wallace Fugate's case, he did
not even ask for one penny for investigation, not one penny for an
expert. Nevertheless, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia found that, under the lax standard of Strickland v.
Washington,46 Mr. Fugate was not denied effective assistance of
counsel.47
If a country is going to have the death penalty, at the very least it
should provide those facing it with a lawyer. The American Bar Asso-
ciation and other professional organizations should be concerned
about that. It is a disgrace to our profession and to our justice system
that courts allow these kinds of lawyers to be representing people in
capital cases. A patient who went to a doctor who had never heard of
penicillin and was not treated properly because of the doctor's lack of
knowledge would have a pretty good case of malpractice. Yet the
courts says that a lawyer who is completely ignorant of the law and
has never used an investigator passes constitutional muster. Such a
lawyer is like a doctor who has never heard of penicillin and never
used a stethoscope.
Some poor people have faced death alone in the United States.
Georgia has established time frames for every stage of post-conviction
review in capital cases-motions must be filed in 60 days after the
petition is filed, the hearing must be held within 180 days, a decision
must be rendered within 60 days of receiving briefs, and so forth.48
Exzavious Gibson, a condemned man, did not have a lawyer, so he
filed a pro se form petition that a lot of people on death row file in
order to avoid being barred by the statute of limitations. His case was
promptly set for a hearing. The hearing started as follows:
The Court: Okay. Mr. Gibson, do you want to proceed?
Gibson: I don't have an attorney.
46. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
47. See Fugate v. Turpin, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1383, 1388 (M.D. Ga. 1998).
48. See Ga. Super. Ct. R. 44.6, 44.9, 44.12 (1999).
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The Court: I understand that.
Gibson: I am not waiving my rights.
The Court: I understand that. Do you have any evidence you want
to put up?
Gibson: I don't know what to plead.
The Court: Huh?
Gibson: I don't know what to plead.
The Court: I am not asking you to plead anything. I am just asking
you if you have anything you want to put up, anything you want to
introduce to this Court.
Gibson: But I don't have an attorney.49
Nevertheless, the court went ahead with the hearing. The state was
represented by an assistant Attorney General who specialized in capi-
tal habeas corpus cases. After his former attorney had been called as
a witness against him, Gibson was asked if he wanted to conduct the
cross-examination:
The Court: Mr. Gibson, would you like to ask Mr. Mullis any
questions?
Gibson: I don't have any counsel.
The Court: I understand that, but I am asking, can you tell me yes
or no whether you want to ask him any questions or not?
Gibson: I'm not my own counsel.
The Court: I'm sorry, sir, I didn't understand you.
Gibson: I'm not my own counsel.
The Court: I understand, but do you want, do you, individually,
want to ask him anything?
Gibson: I don't know.
The Court: Okay, sir. Okay, thank you, Mr. Mullis, you can go
down.50
Gibson tendered no evidence, examined no witnesses, and made no
objections. The judge denied Gibson relief by signing an order pre-
pared by the Attorney General's office without making a single
change.
Some outstanding lawyers and firms have volunteered through the
ABA Death Penalty Representation Project, directed by Elisabeth
Semel, to take a capital case pro bono. Some death row inmate may
have the good fortune to get outstanding legal representation. But
others may end up with no lawyer at all, as Gibson did.
49. Transcript of hearing of Sept. 12, 1996, at 2-3, Gibson v. Turpin, Super. Ct. of
Butts Co., Ga., No. 95-V-648 (on file with author).
50. Id. at 67.
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Gibson did not know how to cross-examine. He did not ask any
questions. He was completely incapable of representing himself.
Much later-the judge had put everyone else on a very tight deadline,
but not himself-the judge signed an order that the Attorney General
of Georgia had prepared, without changing a single word of it, deny-
ing Exzavious Gibson habeas corpus relief.51
Those who are lawyers, who are trustees of justice, who care about
the integrity of our system, should be deeply troubled by these and
many other examples of inadequate representation.52 The major rea-
son for it is lack of money. In Alabama, all a lawyer may receive for
time spent out of court representing a person in a death penalty case is
$20 an hour, up to a limit of $1,000. 53 If a lawyer spends a thousand
hours, which is about what it takes to get ready for a case, he or she is
going to get $1 an hour. It is not possible to get very good legal repre-
sentation, in Alabama or anywhere else, for $1 an hour. Call one of
the law firms there and ask it to prepare a will or something else sim-
ple and offer to pay $1 an hour.
Poor people facing the death penalty are represented primarily by
two groups of lawyers. One is made up of young inexperienced law-
yers who are conscripted by the courts to take a case, and often never
do a second case, so there is no building up of any expertise. Another
group is made up of the old, broken-down lawyers, some of whom are
drug addicted, some of whom are alcoholic, and some of whom are so
completely lacking in knowledge, ability, and initiative that they can-
not do anything but take court appointments and try to handle as
many cases as possible. There are also conscientious, dedicated law-
yers, but often they cannot afford to do more than a few capital cases.
Many judges appoint lawyers from the first two groups but not the
third.
Some lawyers who take court appointments do not even have of-
fices. I once saw a judge quip when a lawyer reached in his jacket
pocket, "Counsel, I see you're going back to your office." The judge
thought that was funny, but it is not. The judiciary and the bar should
not see these lawyers as court jesters, colorful characters there for
their amusement. They should see them as major deficiencies in our
system of justice. Poor people whose lives and liberty are at stake
should be well-represented, as well as any corporation is represented.
The special counsel, Kenneth Starr, has spent more money on his
investigation of President Clinton than the whole public defender sys-
tem of the state of Kentucky spends in two years. Perhaps we need to
51. The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the denial of counsel and the denial of the
petition. See Gibson v. Turpin, No. S97R1412, 1999 WL 79655, at *10 (Ga. Feb. 22,
1999).
52. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835 (1994).
53. See Ala. Code § 15-12-21(d) (1995).
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know whether the President engaged in sexual acts with an intern and
whether he is telling the truth about it, but it is not nearly as important
as whether people are going to live or die.
MR. CARTER:54
It is indeed a great honor for me to be here this morning. In fact,
given my history over the past sixty-two years, after spending twenty
of those years in prison and almost being executed myself, it is a great
pleasure for me to be anywhere today.
But there is nothing pleasing in the fact that there are over 3000
people on death row in the United States facing execution for things
they may or may not have done. It is absolutely obscene that the
United States is the only Western industrialized nation that still main-
tains the anachronism of the death penalty.
This gathering is absolutely vital and necessary. I truly lack the
words to tell you how much it means when you are sitting on death
row waiting to be executed, to know that there are people like you
attending events like this, that there are people who truly care about
justice, and that there are people who really care about life itself. It
really gives us hope. In a place as hopeless and desperate as prison,
there is nothing more important than hope: hope that something can
happen, hope that wrongs can be righted.
And wrongs can be righted. My presence here is living proof of
that. I consider it a great privilege to be on the Board of Directors of
the Southern Center for Human Rights, an organization that fights
tirelessly and endlessly against the death penalty. So, I would be re-
miss if I did not address this ominous issue myself.
It is absolutely impossible to speak about doing away with the death
penalty -without speaking first about habeas corpus, politics, popular
culture, and fear. I recently heard someone say, "The law is just poli-
tics by other means; crime is politics and the death penalty is the poli-
tics of crime." I really do not know what that means, but what is
driving the current push in the United States to clamp down on
habeas corpus if not politics? And what drives politics if not fear?
54. Rubin Hurricane Carter, who now makes his home in Toronto, spent almost
twenty years in prison for a crime he did not commit. About to fight for the world
middle-weight boxing championship, Mr. Carter (along with John Artis) was arrested,
convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1966 murder of three whites in a New Jersey
bar. In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned the conviction based on the
recantation of the state's key witnesses, but at a new trial, where the same witness was
allowed to recant his recantation, Mr. Carter was convicted again. In 1985, Mr. Carter
was finally able to present his claim of innocence to a United States District Court,
which ruled that Carter's conviction had been based on "racism rather than reason
and concealment rather than disclosure," and Mr. Carter was freed on a writ of
habeas corpus. In February 1988, the 22-year-old indictment against Mr. Carter was
dismissed on the state's own motion. Mr. Carter now heads the Toronto-based Asso-
ciation in Defense of the Wrongly Convicted and is an outspoken lecturer on such
diverse subjects as literacy, education, and the death penalty.
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Roger Keith Coleman, a Virginia coal miner, was killed, not by a
coal mining accident, but simply because his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was rejected by a United States federal court.55 His
case received an unprecedented amount of media attention. He was
on talk shows from Larry King to Donahue to Good Morning
America, letting not a moment go by without protesting his inno-
cence. Even Time magazine came out with a powerful cover story
which made a strong showing of Coleman's innocence. 6
I had an opportunity to speak with Roger Coleman one day before
the State of Virginia murdered him. His clarity, his eloquence, and his
presence of mind under that dreadful thing that was hanging over him
impressed me. At one point, a prison nurse interrupted our conversa-
tion; she was concerned because Roger had missed his scheduled med-
ication for a sore shoulder. I said to him, "Brother, this is crazy. Here
the State is about to take your life and they're worried about your
health." Roger laughed, and I laughed too, but I cried the next day
when I saw him being carried from the prison in a body bag.
Roger Coleman was barred from presenting his evidence of inno-
cence to a federal court. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
rejected because of a procedural technicality.57 His petition had been
filed one day late.58
What does that mean to us? If we should see on the evening news
that the bank where we have been keeping our life savings has just
been held up, what would we do? We would cry bloody murder. We
would do everything we could to catch the thief and get our money
back. We would not be complacent about that. We would know that
a theft has occurred and we would be legitimately outraged. Likewise,
if Congress tried to reduce our Social Security benefits, we would view
that as robbery, because we know that if not today, then one day that
will affect us, and we would holler.
The question I would like to pose here is: Why is the same thing
not happening now that the great writ is under attack and our free-
dom account is being looted? Where is the outrage? People in the
United States were taken for over $5 billion in the savings and loans
debacle. Why do we not realize that with the limitations placed on the
writ of habeas corpus, we are being robbed of something as real as
money, and far more valuable?
This seemingly insignificant piece of paper, the writ of habeas
corpus, is the only thing that prevented me from languishing in prison
for the rest of my life, from wasting away and dying in prison. The
reality of that prospect is worse than whatever you can imagine. This
55. See Coleman v. Virginia, 465 U.S. 1109, 1109 (1984).
56. See Richard Lacayo, You Don't Always Get Perry Mason, Time, June 1, 1992,
at 38.
57. See Coleman v. Thompson, 504 U.S. 188, 189 (1992) (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
58. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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simple piece of paper, the writ of habeas corpus, was the key to my
freedom. The key that Roger Coleman in Virginia and Lionel Her-
rera in Texas did not have. Today, they are both dead. This simple
piece of paper, these few words, "It is ordered that the petition of
Rubin Carter for a writ of habeas corpus hereby is granted," gave me
back my life and gave precious hope to so many others.
The great writ is indeed something tangible. It is not abstract, but
real, and the concrete right of every man, woman, and child in the
United States. It is our birthright to be free from arbitrary, capricious,
unjust, unconstitutional judgment, confinement, or execution. The
writ of habeas corpus is the one life-affirming jewel in the crown of
thorns we know as the criminal justice system.
But now there are forces at work in the United States trying to limit
our access to it even further. Our freedom account is being looted.
The work that the ABA, the Southern Center for Human Rights, the
Association for and in Defense of the Wrongly Convicted, the Cen-
turian Ministry, and Larry Marshall's organization in Chicago are un-
dertaking to try to safeguard the writ of habeas corpus would make
the Argean stables that Hercules had to clean up look like light work.
In 1966, I was at the peak of my career, a professional prizefighter
about to fight for the championship of the world. But the next thing I
knew, I was fighting for my very life, on trial in Criminal Court. I was
accused of murdering three people in a New Jersey bar,59 and I did
not even drink then. I do now. The State sought the death penalty.
The odds of my being alive today were not exactly in my favor. All
three murder victims were white. The jury was all white. The judge,
the police, the State's vitnesses, and the prosecutors were all white. I
am black.
The State's case was based principally on the testimony of two ca-
reer criminals, themselves suspects in the crime. With the incentive of
a $10,000 reward, they claimed they saw me at the scene.' ° I was con-
victed even though I did not remotely fit the description of the assail-
ants; even though the two surviving victims could not and did not
identify me and even said it was not me; even though I had a number
of alibi witnesses placing me elsewhere at the time of the crime; even
though I passed a lie detector test showing that I had no involvement;
and even though I had been exonerated by two separate grand ju-
ries.6' Luckily, if you can call the hell of a triple life sentence or
spending twenty years in prison luck, I escaped execution. There is a
rush to death in our society, a chilling climate of anti-crime hysteria
and fear. That is our real adversary here-fear. We cannot turn on
the television or open up the newspaper without the specter of violent
59. See State v. Carter, 255 A.2d 746, 748 (NJ. 1969).
60. See id.
61. See id at 749-50.
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crime menacing our living rooms, scaring us to death. Fear is really at
the heart of everything. Fear feeds prejudice, inflames passions, en-
clouds judgment. When you fear someone, anything is possible. You
can then justify anything, psychologically and legally, from slavery to
segregation to anti-Semitism to the McCarthy witch hunts. You can
justify the erosion of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and you
can justify the wholesale application of the death penalty against mi-
norities, the poor, the disadvantaged, and the disenfranchised.
What can we do about it? As history has shown, we cannot do any-
thing if we let ourselves become overwhelmed, jaded, and cynical. My
attorneys, Myron Beldock and Professor Leon Friedman, both New
Yorkers, took up my case after I had long since run out of money.
They worked on my behalf for over ten years without any expectation
of ever being financially compensated. They did it, they say, because
it was the right thing to do. They did it pro bono and they are the first
to proclaim how much richer they are for having done it. As Mr.
Beldock likes to say, "Money is not the only currency." He also likes
to say, and I guess this is a lawyer's joke, "People make counterfeit
money, but in many more cases, money makes counterfeit people."
More often than not, the law is studied only as an abstraction, and
we forget that laws critically affect human lives, that human lives are
literally at stake. You have the power to make a difference. You can
save lives. Is that important? "The petition of Rubin Carter for a writ
of habeas corpus is hereby granted."62 It has been almost thirteen
years now since the Honorable J. Lee Sarokin penned his big, bold,
beautiful signature beneath those lines. Without the tireless efforts
and dedication of people like yourselves and the Southern Center for
Human Rights, I would not have this document today and I sure as
hell would not be here in Canada with you this morning, free and
alive.
So, is your work important? I defy anyone to tell me that it is not.
PROFESSOR SCHABAS: 63
When we ask whether the United States is in violation of interna-
tional law on the subject of the death penalty, what exactly are we
talking about? Unfortunately, there are a lot of people in Washington
62. Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 560 (D.N.J. 1985).
63. Professor William A. Schabas is a Professor of International Human Rights
Law at the D6partement des sciences juridiques of the Universit6 du Quebec Ai Mon-
trfal, a Department he chaired from 1994-1998. Professor Schabas is a member of the
Quebec Human Rights Tribunal and is the honorary President of the Canadian
Human Rights Foundation. In 1998, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada awarded Professor Schabas the Bora Laskin Research Fellowship
in Human Rights. He is the author of several books, including The Abolition of the
Death Penalty in International Law (1997), and is President of "Hands Off Cain," an
international non-governmental organization based in Rome, Italy, dedicated to the
abolition of the death penalty.
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and elsewhere who shrug their shoulders and say, "Who cares what
international law has to say?"
The good news is that elsewhere in the world, many people are very
concerned about what international law has to say about capital pun-
ishment. This explains why abolition has made so many strides for-
ward in the past ten years. Steve Bright gave us some of the figures
about that progress.'
Let me give a few examples of how international law has moved
forward the agenda on abolition of the death penalty. In South Af-
rica, by a judgment of the new Constitutional Court in June of 1995,
the death penalty was abolished.6" That judgment was later confirmed
in the new Constitution of South Africa.6 In a subsequent opinion 67
the eleven members of the new Constitutional Court make frequent
and regular reference to international law on the subject of the death
penalty, to the decisions of the Human Rights Committee of the
United Nations, to the various international legal instruments, and to
the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. It is clear
that in coming to its conclusion that the death penalty violates the
right to life and violates the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and de-
grading treatment or punishment, the South African Constitutional
Court was enormously influenced by international law on the subject
of the death penalty.
Some months later, the Russian Federation abolished the imple-
mentation of the death penalty.68 South Africa and the Russian Fed-
eration together represent perhaps 200 million people.6 9 Russia took
its action because Russia was anxious to become a member of the
Council of Europe, headquartered in Strasbourg. The Council of Eu-
rope told Russia that if it wanted to join the Council of Europe, it had
to impose a moratorium on executions and then abolish the death
penalty.70
64. See supra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
65. See State v. Makwanyane, Case No. CTTI3/94 (South Africa CC June 6, 1995),
reprinted in 16 Hum. Rts. LJ. 154 (1995); William A. Schabas, South Africa's New
Constitutional Court Abolishes the Death Penalty, 16 Hum. Rts. L.J. 133, 133 (1995).
66. See Schabas, supra note 65, at 135.
67. State v. Williams, Case No. CCT120194 (South African CC June 9, 1995), avail-
able in Microsoft Word fonnat at <http'//sunsite.vits.ac.za/witsilaw/judgements/
williams.doc>.
68. See Anatolyi V. Naumov, The New Russian Criminal Code as a Reflection of
Ongoing Reforns, 8 Crim. L.F. 191, 196 (1997).
69. See Robert J. Cottrol, Submission Is not the Answer: Lethal Violence,
Microcultures of Criminal Violence and the Right to Self-Defense, 69 U. Colo. L Rev.
1029, 1036 n.16 (1998) (noting that Russia's population is 150 million people); South
Africans View Illegal Immigrants as Economic Thieves, Star Trib., Nov. 27, 1998, at
33A (noting that South Africa's population is approximately 37 million).
70. Eur. Parl. Ass'n Res. 1097, 24th sitting (June 28, 1996), available at Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution No. 1097 (1996) on the Abolition
of the Death Penalty in Europe (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http:/lstars.coe.fritalta961
eresl097.html>.
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Russia is not alone in this. Through actions in Eastern Europe and
Russia since 1991, the frontier of the death penalty has been pushed
back from somewhere along the Elbe or the Oder River to the Pacific
Ocean. The question is how we impress this message upon the United
States as a way to advance the agenda on the abolition of the death
penalty.
The beginning of international law and the death penalty is really
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose fiftieth anniver-
sary we celebrate this year.71 Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights says that everyone shall have the right to life.72 The
members of the Commission on Human Rights asked the Secretariat
(which at the time was headed by a Canadian law professor, John P.
Humphrey) to prepare a draft of the Universal Declaration.
Humphrey came up with a forty-eight article draft.73 He did so by
looking at all the constitutions in the world and a number of drafts of
the Universal Declaration that had come from non-governmental or-
ganizations and from other bodies from some governments. He put
them all together and said that what he produced was kind of a com-
mon denominator, what we would find if we just took everything and
sorted it out. 74
One of the first articles in that draft said that everyone shall have
the right to life except in the execution of a sentence duly pronounced
by a duly constituted court.75 Underneath, where all the footnotes
were, he said where this came from. Of course, American lawyers will
recognize that it comes from the Fifth Amendment. There were simi-
lar provisions, because of the influence of the American Bill of Rights,
in other domestic constitutions.
When Eleanor Roosevelt reviewed this draft, she said that the last
part, which says "except in the execution of a sentence pronounced by
a duly constituted court," should be deleted. She said that although
we were not there yet, because most countries in the world still im-
posed the death penalty, we were heading in that direction, and we
would not want the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to stand
in the way of the progressive development of human rights law on the
subject of capital punishment.76
71. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 67th plen. mtg., art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948), reprinted in 43 Am. J. Int'l L.
127, 127 (Supp. 1949).
72. See id. at 128.
73. See John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its His-
tory, Impact and Judicial Character, in Human Rights: Thirty Years After the Univer-
sal Declaration 21-37 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and the Death
Penalty, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 733, 740 (1997).
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Here we are, fifty years after the adoption of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights on December 10, 1948, by the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations. We are much closer to the ideal that
Eleanor Roosevelt had envisaged in 1948. That ideal is reflected in
the text of the Universal Declaration, which makes no reference to
capital punishment and at least implicitly-if we read the preparatory
work on the Declaration-sends the message that international
human rights law is heading in the direction of, and is oriented to-
wards, the abolition of capital punishment.
That provision, Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, is the framework on which international human rights law has
developed since 1948. There are a number of more detailed standards
or norms in international human rights dealing with the death penalty
that have progressively shrunk the scope of the death penalty, im-
posed an increasing number of restrictions on its use, and indicated
that the abolition of the death penalty has to be the objective of inter-
national human rights.
I recently participated in the diplomatic conference on the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court statute,
which was adopted by 120 states in favor to seven opposed, does not
include the death penalty.77 The maximum sentence for the worst
criminals known to humanity who can be judged by the International
Criminal Court, which was just established at the diplomatic confer-
ence, is life imprisonment.78 It is life in prison with parole review that
is mandatory after twenty-five years, even without any request by the
inmate.79 That is in sharp contrast with the last major experiment in
international criminal justice-the Nuremberg trials-where the
death penalty was not only provided for but was in fact imposed on
many of those found guilty.80
I will now briefly discuss a few of the international standards and
compare them -with practice in the United States. The first subject I
will speak to is the issue of juvenile executions. Steve Bright has al-
ready spoken about this to some extent. Juvenile executions are pro-
hibited by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,8"
article 6, paragraph 5. This International Covenant is the treaty that
was adopted to give a binding effect to the principles set out in the
Universal Declaration. Article 6, paragraph 5 states that no person
shall be executed for a crime committed under the age of eighteen.
77. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 77, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998).
78. See id.
79. See idL
80. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, adopted Aug. 8, 1945, art. 27, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 300; Telford
Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir 609-11 (1992).
81. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, art. 6, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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Similar provisions appear in a number of other human rights trea-
ties: the American Convention on Human Rights;82 the Geneva Con-
ventions dealing with armed conflict;8 3 and, most recently, the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,84 which binds essen-
tially all countries in the world, including the United States. While the
United States has not yet ratified the Convention on the Rights of the
Child-for all intents and purposes it is the only state in the world
now not to have ratified that important international Convention-
the United States has signed it. Pursuant to international law and the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the United States is bound
to respect the object and purpose of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child until such time as it ratifies the treaty.85 So, I would say that
all states in the world including the United States are now bound not
to impose juvenile executions.
The United States recently ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and logically, therefore, is bound by the pro-
hibition on juvenile executions contained in article 6, paragraph 5.
The United States formulated a reservation to article 6, paragraph 5,
which in essence said, "We ratify the treaty, but we do not ratify all of
it. There are some things in there that we don't want to be bound by
and we want to be cut out from that part of the treaty." A sharp
debate ensued. Eleven European countries took the very unusual
step of objecting publicly to this reservation by the United States, by
filing public declarations with the United Nations. The Human Rights
Committee, the body charged with implementing the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, said in 1995 that the reserva-
tion by the United States was invalid.16 I think that means that, pursu-
ant to this decision of the Human Rights Committee, the United
States is very clearly in violation of its international obligations when
it executes juveniles, or individuals, for crimes committed while under
the age of 18.
82. American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica,
adopted Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4., 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 146 (entered into force July 18,
1978).
83. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Oct. 21, 1950, § 4, art. 68, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 330; Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, art. 77, § 5, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 39;
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977,
art. 6, § 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 614; see William A. Schabas, The Death Penalty for
Crimes Committed by Persons Under Eighteen Years of Age, in Monitoring Children's
Rights 603, 603-19 (Eugen Verhellen ed., 1996).
84. 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1470, art. 37, § a (1989).
85. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 18, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
86. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, Comments of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/
Add.50 (1995), § 14.
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I hesitate when I say "juveniles" because they are not juveniles by
the time they get to be executed. Many of them are well into their
thirties by the time they get to this point. For example, Stanford,
whose case the Supreme Court decided in 1989, was seventeen years
old at the time of the crime but is now a middle-aged man in prison.87
That brings me to the next point-what we call the death row phe-
nomenon. That is the issue of whether it is proper, whether it respects
the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punish-
ment, to execute an individual who has already spent a lengthy period
of time under sentence of death. Litigation on this issue began in the
United States in the Caryl Chessman case in the late 1950s. In Chess-
man's case, the California Supreme Court ruled that executing him
twelve or thirteen years after the crime was legal.' This decision just
followed a judicial election, and some observers said that if the previ-
ous judges had stayed on the bench, he would have won the case.
In international law, the death row phenomenon has become a very
major issue, mainly in an indirect sense. The leading case on this
came before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in
1989. The Court was confronted with a case of a man named Soering,
who was due to be extradited to Virginia for a capital crime.8 9 He was
nineteen or twenty years old at the time of the trial, and had been
over eighteen when the crime was committed. 9 Soering argued,
based on statistics, that he was likely to spend six to eight years on
death row in Virginia if he were extradited and sentenced to death. 91
The European Court of Human Rights said that that was cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment or punishment, and that it violated the
European Convention on Human Rights. 92 As a result, for all intents
and purposes now, nobody is extradited from Europe to the United
States without an undertaking pursuant to extradition treaties that the
death penalty will not be imposed.
Case law on the death row phenomenon has continued to advance.
In 1993, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which is a form
of international tribunal, ruled in a case coming from the Common-
wealth Caribbean that even six to eight years was too long.93 The
Privy Council decision, in the case of Pratt, said that five years was the
length of time that could be tolerated before somebody was
executed.94
As you are no doubt aware, a great many of the 3000 cases in the
United States exceed five years. But the jurisprudence on this of the
87. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 365 (1989).
88. See People v. Chessman, 341 P.2d 679, 699-700 (Cal. 1959).
89. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 1 (1989).
90. See id at 11.
91. See id at 25.
92. See id at 50.
93. Pratt v. Attorney Gen., 4 All. E.R. 769, 788-89 (1993).
94. See id
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European Court, of the Privy Council, and of other international and
national courts has really yet to be developed within the United
States. In one case, Lackey v. Texas,95 which came before the
Supreme Court a few years ago, the Supreme Court bumped it back to
the lower courts for further litigation.96 A couple of Supreme Court
justices said the case law from Europe and elsewhere was interesting,
but did not suggest that they were going to buy into it.97
Thus, the gauntlet has been set down on the issue of the death row
phenomenon. My view, if I am ever appointed to the United States
Supreme Court, is that the United States is in violation of interna-
tional law on the subject of the death row phenomenon. Moreover,
by ricochet, the United States is also in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, because the Eighth Amendment essentially includes the
same norm as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the other instruments.
In 1957, the United States Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles98 said
that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted according to
"evolving standards of decency." 99 Where do we get these evolving
standards of decency? In Gregg v. Georgia,' the Supreme Court said
it would get them by looking at what the state legislators do. 1' 1 I
would say that where you really should get the evolving standards of
decency from are the European Court of Human Rights in Stras-
bourg, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the United Na-
tions Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, and the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in London.
Steve Bright spoke about procedural fairness, and I will simply add
a few words about the Breard case. Breard, who was sentenced to
death as a foreign national, was entitled under article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations to be in communication with his
consulate and, logically therefore, to have access to a competent law-
yer. This is what Paraguay has argued."° It said that its consulate
should have been contacted and told that Angel Breard was there in
prison awaiting trial, because it would have looked after him.
Paraguay is not the only state that has this grievance with the
United States; Canada has the same grievance. For example, a Cana-
dian named Stan Faulder, sits on death row in Texas. °3 Faulder was
convicted under circumstances similar to Breard's. The Canadian
95. 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).
96. See id. at 1047.
97. See id. at 1046-47.
98. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
99. Id. at 101.
100. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
101. See id. at 173-76.
102. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1354 (1998).
103. Kathleen Kenna, Court Turns Down Faulder Appeal Bid, Toronto Star, Jan.
26, 1999, at 1.
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government is mad as hell about this and is fighting through diplo-
matic channels with the United States on this issue. There are other
Canadians as well who have been convicted and sentenced to death
and are awaiting execution in violation of this international treaty.
Canada has, through this treaty, a contract with the United States. It
is an international multilateral treaty. Under this contract, the United
States is supposed to inform Canadian nationals if they are arrested in
the United States of their right to communicate with their consular
officials. But that is not being done.
Someone might say that the Vienna Convention is not that impor-
tant. A few months ago, the International Court of Justice issued an
order saying to the United States that it was not to proceed with the
execution of Angel Breard.1 4 But the Governor of Virginia violated
that order. Ironically, the only other time such an order has been re-
quested of the International Court of Justice was at the request of the
United States, in 1979. Under the very same treaty, the United States
asked that the International Court of Justice issue an interim order
against Iran, and it did so.'0 5 The United States then went to the Se-
curity Council saying that Iran had to be made to respect that, because
it was international law. Yet, the United States had an order issued
against it in April 1998 by that same International Court of Justice,
and the United States Supreme Court said "we cannot do anything
about that." The Governor of Virginia said he was going ahead with
the execution, and the United States violated that treaty.'06
I will conclude with one final issue that deals with international
standards on the death penalty and which has been violated at least in
some states. This is the issue of the method of execution. Interna-
tional tribunals, more particularly the Human Rights Committee of
the United Nations, have recently addressed the issue of the method
of execution, stating that some methods of execution constitute cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment.
Ng was an individual who was extradited from Canada to the
United States. 7 His lawyer filed a petition with the Human Rights
Committee. Among the arguments he invoked was that Ng, who was
subject to execution in the gas chamber in California, would be exe-
cuted by a method that violated the international prohibition on cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment. The Human
Rights Committee agreed with him and ruled that would be a viola-
104. Order of 9 April 1998-Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (vis-
ited Mar. 9, 1999) <http:l/wwv.icj-cij.org/icjwwvwidocketlipaus/ipausorder/
ipausiorder_toc.htm>.
105. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(U.S.A. v. Iran), 1979 I.CJ. 21 (interim order of Dec. 15, 1979).
106. See Breard, 118 S. Ct. at 1357 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing Brief of United
States as Amicus Curiae).
107. See Extradition to California to Face Death Penalty by Cyanide Gas Asphyxia-
tion Violates Art 7 of the Covenant, Ng v. Canada, 15 Hum. Rts. LJ . 149, 149 (1994).
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tion of the International Covenant. 10 8 A few states, including Florida,
still use the electric chair. 109 They do not use it very adroitly, some-
times even burning people's heads off. I have no doubt that the elec-
tric chair, too, would be ruled to be a violation of international law.
The real issue is how to get this before the American public, before
the American courts, and before American legislators. Other places
in the world that did not care at all about international human rights
law five years ago, such as Russia and South Africa, have now
changed their laws because of international human rights law. I think
that this is one of the ways in which we will move towards abolition of
the death penalty within the United States.
When the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was
originally being drafted back in the early 1950s, Eleanor Roosevelt
was a member on the United States delegation. After the 1952 elec-
tion, she was removed from the delegation. John Foster Dulles took
charge of the file on human rights. He issued a declaration saying that
the United States would never ratify the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which was then being negotiated." 0 Dulles
said that the United States did not need it or any other international
human rights treaties, because it had the American Bill of Rights."' I
do not want to denigrate the American Bill of Rights, which has made
an enormous contribution historically to the development of human
rights. But we have to recognize that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights also makes a very major and important
contribution.
What is significant is that Dulles was wrong. As Yogi Berra said,
"Never say never." The United States did ratify it, in 1992. It was the
115th state to ratify it." 2 I think the reason it ratified it is that the
United States could not remain outside of the international human
rights system. It could not do what Dulles said. Dulles hoped that
international human rights doctrine would flounder and fail, but it did
not. It grew. It thrived. It continued to develop and continues to
develop. The proof is that in 1992 the United States felt compelled to
ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
It tried to get in on its own terms. It tried to get in with reserva-
tions. It tried to buy into international law at no cost. But the inter-
national community has thrown it back at the United States and said,
in effect, "No. If you're coming in, you're coming in on the interna-
tional terms. You must respect, among other things, the prohibition
108. See id. at 157.
109. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 11.
110. See William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 Brook. J. Int'l L. 277,
279 n.12 (1995).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 277.
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against the execution of juveniles." I am convinced that develop-
ment-from Dulles in 1953 to President Bush in 1992, because it was
Bush who did it then-will eventually mean that the progressive aboli-
tion of the death penalty, which we see internationally, is going to
influence the development of law within the United States itself.
MR. ALLMAND:
113
The question put to us today is whether United States death penalty
policy is consistent within international human rights law. I do not
think this is the right question. The death penalty is not really a legal
issue, but a moral and political one. What would it prove if the United
States system is consistent with international human rights law? If it
were, would that justify the application of the death penalty in the
United States? At one time international human rights permitted
slavery, apartheid, and other human rights crimes. The real question
is whether the United States death penalty system is consistent with
twentieth century international moral standards, consistent with en-
lightened world public opinion, and consistent with recent interna-
tional legal pronouncements and decisions.
Of course, it is always interesting for lawyers to debate the legality
of issues. Lawyers being what they are could construct the sketchy
argument that the United States death penalty is consistent with inter-
national human rights law. After all, while the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, in article 3, says that everyone has the right to life,
liberty, and security of person,'1 4 and, in article 5, states that no one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment," 5 neither article explicitly forbids the death pen-
alty. This is supported by article 6, subsection 2 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which says that a sentence of
death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes.' 1 6 As a re-
sult, lawyers and legislators in the United States might argue that the
death penalty in their country is consistent with international human
113. Honourable Warren Allmand, P.C., Q.C., is the President of the International
Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development in Montreal, Quebec, Can-
ada. The Centre is an independent Canadian non-profit, charitable organization man-
dated to defend and promote the rights and freedoms enshrined in the International
Bill of Human Rights and to encourage the development of democratic societies. Mr.
Allmand was a Member of the House of Commons from 1965 to 1997 and also has
served in the Cabinet as Solicitor General, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, and Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs.
114. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 67th plen. mtg., art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 Am. J. Int'l L
127, 128 (Supp. 1949).
115. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 67th plen. mtg., art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 Am. J. Int'l L
127, 128 (Supp. 1949).
116. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, pt. III,
art. 6, § 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174-75.
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rights law in that it is only being used for murder, the most serious of
crimes.
On the other hand, one could argue, and I would say with much
greater credibility, that the entire spirit of these articles I referred to is
contrary to the death penalty and focuses and foresees its eventual
abolition. It is significant that these articles were passed in 1948 and
then 1976, and have since been bypassed by much stronger statements
in later treaties and resolutions, some of which have been referred to
already. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child states, in
article 37A, that capital punishment shall not be imposed on children
under eighteen years of age." 7 The 1989 Second Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for
the total abolition of the death penalty." 8 The same is true of the
1970 Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights and the
1983 Sixth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.1 19
Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary
and Arbitrary Executions under the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights published a report in December 1997 not only con-
demning extrajudicial executions, but the death penalty in general. 120
The two are related, because once the death penalty is justified in cer-
tain circumstances, an environment is established where less scrupu-
lous individuals can justify it in a much wider range of circumstances.
On April 4, 1998, the Special Rapporteur made a further statement, in
which he said that the application of the death penalty in the United
States is tainted by racism, economic discrimination, politics, and an
excessive deference to victims' rights. 121 He noted that (as has been
referred to earlier today) the United States is one of only five coun-
tries to permit the execution of defendants who committed their
crimes before they were eighteen years of age, in violation of the In-
ternational Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, which the United
States has ratified. 22 The other countries are Iran, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, and Yemen.' 23 At the same time, earlier this year, he and the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights called for a worldwide
117. See Adoption of Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 44th Sess., Agenda Item 108, U.N. Doc. A1441736 (1989).
118. See International Covenants on Human Rights: Report of the Third Committee,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 98, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/44/824 (1989).
119. See Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr. 28,
1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114.
120. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 32.
121. See Mark Tran, US Singled Out as Death Penalty Is Condemned, Guardian
(London), Apr. 4, 1998, at 16.
122. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 116, 999
U.N.T.S. at 175.
123. See supra note 20.
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moratorium on capital punishment. 124 It is interesting to note that as
of 1996, 102 states were abolitionists in law or in practice and only
ninety retentionists. 1' So the majority of states in the world are
abolitionists.
The most recent and perhaps the most important decision was taken
on July 17, 1998, when 120 nations voted to establish a permanent
International Criminal Court for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide."2 They overwhelmingly rejected proposals to include
the death penalty as a sanction for these most serious crimes."17 Some
countries put forward amendments to include the death penalty, argu-
ing that the crimes in question were the most serious crimes imagina-
ble and consequently the most serious penalty-death-should apply.
The majority said no. They said that the death penalty is no longer
acceptable, that it is not only ineffective in curtailing the crimes in
question, but also that those using it simply descend to the same moral
level as the criminals themselves.
In earlier times, legislators could make a moral argument for capital
punishment because they honestly believed it was an instrument of
self-defense, a means of protection, and consequently, was justified.
But in recent times, we have learned that this not so. Statistics have
demonstrated over and over again that the application of the death
penalty has not led to lower murder rates, and therefore better protec-
tion for the public. 28 As a matter of fact, the lowest murder rates are
in countries that have abolished the death penalty.1 29 Since the aboli-
tion of the death penalty in Canada in 1976, we have had a steady
decline, with only 581 homicides last year for our entire country of
twenty-six million people.13 0 This is a rate of two per 100,000.
We now have considerable evidence that not only is the death pen-
alty not a more effective deterrent to murder, but more seriously, the
consequence of its use is ambiguous, uncertain, and unreliable. That
is, it does not really protect the public against murder, and at the same
time it is discretionary and capricious in its use from the laying of
charges, to plea bargaining, to the decision of the court, to the grant-
ing of commutation. It is inequitable in its application, bearing more
124. See Question of the Death Penalty: Commission on Human Rights Resohtion
1998/8 (visited Jan. 16, 1999) <http:/lunhchr.chlhtmllmenu4/ChrreSI1998.res8.htm>.
125. See Status of the International Covenants on Hunan Rights: Question of the
Death Penalty, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4t19981
82 (1998).
126. See Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Dissents, but Accord Is Reached on War-Crime
Court, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1998, at A3.
127. See Daniel J. Brown, Note, The International Criminal Court and Trial in Ab-
sentia, 24 Brook. J. Int'l L. 763, 777 (1999).
128. See Dale Turner, Death Penalty Isn't Way to Deter Crime or Deal Punishment,
Seattle Times, Apr. 23, 1994, at D5.
129. See id.
130. See Murder Rate in Canada Drops 9% to 25-Year Low, Orlando Sentinel, Oct.
28, 1998, at A14.
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heavily on the poor and minorities. And it is irreversible when mis-
takes are made.
There were three cases in Canada recently where individuals were
convicted of murder and, after years in prison, were found to be inno-
cent. These are the cases of Moran, Marshall, and Prescott.13 1 Worse
still, the use of capital punishment lessens respect for life. When indi-
viduals are deliberately put to death and the results of these execu-
tions are dubious in terms of the public good, the sole justification
would appear to be retribution and revenge: a system of justice based
on "an eye for an eye" and damn the consequences. We have to recall
that the principal purpose of the criminal law, as part of the criminaljustice system, is not to convict and punish but rather to prevent, de-
ter, and reduce crime and thereby to protect the public.' 32 It is cer-
tainly not to perpetuate unfairness nor to be disproportionate,
counterproductive, and to lessen respect for the legal system and for
life, which I believe the practice of capital punishment is doing.
To return to the original question that was put to us, I believe that
the death penalty as applied in certain states in the United States is
not only contrary to international human rights law, certainly to the
most recent expressions of international human rights law, but more
important, but is contrary to the most thoughtful and developed inter-
national moral standards. It does not accomplish any good for society,
but lessens respect for life and our systems of justice.
DR. SERITI:' 33
In broad terms, South African law is comprised of Roman Dutch
law, English law, statute law, constitutional, and customary law. In
Roman Dutch law, the death penalty was a competent sentence for a
variety of offenses. The same position obtained in English law and
our customary law. The South African Criminal Procedure and Evi-
dence Act of 1917 made the death penalty compulsory for murder
under certain circumstances. In 1955, a new Criminal Procedure Act
was promulgated. That Act also made the death penalty a competent
sentence under certain circumstances.
At the time of passing of the above-mentioned Act, we had three
capital offenses. But in 1958, capital offenses were increased to about
eleven, for example, murder, housebreaking with possession of a dan-
131. See Barry Brown, Opposition to Death Penalty Up Sharply in Canada, Poll
Says, Buffalo News, Jan. 3, 1999, at 7A.
132. See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 76-78 (1968).
133. Dr. W.L. Seriti is Co-Chair of Law Society of South Africa and practices law
with Seriti, Mavundla & Partners in Pretoria, South Africa. During the course of the
last year, Dr. Seriti was appointed acting judge on the Venda High Court and on the
Northern Cape High Court. During the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, Dr. Seriti served as a technical advisor. Dr. Seriti completed his
master's degree on the death penalty and examined the entire administration of jus-
tice, particularly the criminal justice system in South Africa.
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gerous weapon, etc. The reason given by politicians for passing a law
that increased the number of capital crimes was that each of the new
capital offenses was increasing rapidly in frequency and the courts had
to have a strong deterrent power.' 34
In 1962, sabotage was added as a capital offense. 135 In 1963, further
offenses were added to the list of capital offenses, namely, undergoing
training or obtaining information that could further the objects of
communism, and advocating broad economic or social change in
South Africa by violent means through the aid of a foreign govern-
ment or institution.13
6
In 1977, a new Criminal Procedure Act was once more promul-
gated. The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 once more made capi-
tal punishment a competent sentence under certain circumstances.
This Act sets forth our present Criminal Procedure, although it has
now been amended on several occasions. Consequently, at the time of
the advent of our new democratic Constitution, the death penalty was
still one of the competent sentences in terms of our Criminal Code.
Capital punishment has always been subjected to severe criticism.
In South Africa, during 1947, the Landsdown Commission was set up.
Its purpose was to investigate penal and prison reforms.1 37 When
dealing with the death penalty, one of the commissioners stated that
capital punishment is an outdated form of punishment, based on the
old notion of simple retribution, which notion has no place in the
modem world.138
Punishment is the sanction of criminal law. Normally, the difficulty
in criminal punishment is in balancing the interests of society with the
interests of the individual offenders. There are different theories of
punishment. 139 Some have been developed as moral justification for
punishment and have been instrumental in the classification of the na-
ture of punishment. 4 According to one of the said theories, namely,
the preventive theory of punishment, one of the purposes of punish-
ment is the prevention of crime. Punishment is thus justified by the
value of its consequence, i.e., prevention of crime.' 41 Crime is to be
prevented in order to protect society. In certain circumstances, you
might find that society is better protected by rehabilitating an offender
than punishing him. Further, in terms of the deterrent theory, punish-
134. See § 4 of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 9 of 1958; House of Assembly
Hansard 28 January 1958 Col 356.
135. See § 21 of General Law Amendment Act 76 of 1962.
136. See § 5 of General Law Amendment Act 37 of 1963.
137. See James 0. Midgley, Criminology: Corporal Punishment and Penal Policy
Notes on the Continued Use of Corporal Punishment with Reference to South Africa,
73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 388, 394-95 (1982).
138. See id. at 395.
139. See Hart, supra note 132, at 71-72.
140. See id.
141. See id
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ment must deter an individual and the community at large from com-
mitting offenses. The community is generally deterred by threat of
possible punishment. The deterrent effect of punishment cannot be
considered in isolation. Other purposes of punishment should also be
looked at.
From the above, it is evident that the most cogent argument in favor
of capital punishment is that it has a deterrent effect on would-be cap-
ital offenders. However, it is not necessary to execute an offender in
order to deter him and other would-be offenders. Imprisonment can
serve the same purpose. Life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole would effectively incapacitate an offender from committing fur-
ther offenses and would also deter other potential offenders.
Life imprisonment can also satisfy retributive considerations. 142 It
becomes unnecessary to resort to the barbaric death penalty, which
serves no purpose that cannot be satisfied by the humane and effec-
tive life-long imprisonment. If life imprisonment can satisfy the re-
tributive considerations and can also adequately protect society, the
need or purpose of capital punishment disappears altogether. The
continued use of capital punishment then becomes immoral, as it
serves no useful purpose that cannot be served by other human and
civilized forms of punishment.
The cold-blooded execution of an offender is an indication of how
the State does not value human life, and this might escalate violence
in a country. 143 The State must take a lead in showing people how the
State values human life and the State must refrain altogether from any
actions that the State needs the community to refrain from. The State
must show and demonstrate that there can be no reason under the sun
to take another's life. The State must show respect for human life and
dignity.
After the demise of official racial discrimination in our country and
the holding of the first non-racial elections, our country adopted an
interim Constitution. The new interim Constitution came into effect
on April 27, 1994, the date of our first non-racial elections. As stated
earlier, at the time of the birth of our democratic society, section
277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 prescribed that
the death penalty was a competent sentence for murder and other se-
rious crimes.
Our Constitution is a product of negotiations conducted in the
Multi-Party Negotiating Process. Capital punishment was the subject
of debate before and during the Constitution-making process. In or-
der to reach consensus, they did not deal with the question of the
death penalty. The failure to deal specifically with the question of the
142. See id. at 85.
143. See id. at 88.
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death penalty in the Constitution was not accidental, but was to facili-
tate the prompt finalization of our interim Constitution.
However, the South African Law Commission, in its report released
during August 1991, entitled "Report on Group and Human Rights,"
had already described the imposition of the death penalty as "highly
controversial." After receiving comments, the Commission suggested
that our Constitutional Court should be required to decide whether a
right to life expressed in unqualified terms in a draft Bill of Rights
could be circumscribed by a limitation clause contained in the Bill of
Rights. Consequently, the death sentence was neither sanctioned nor
excluded, but was left to the Constitutional Court to decide whether
the provisions of the pre-constitutional law making the death penalty
a competent sentence for murder and other serious crimes are consis-
tent with chapter 3 of the Constitution. chapter 3 is the chapter that
deals with fundamental rights, the right to life, etc.
Section 4(1) of our Constitution states that the Constitution shall be
the supreme law of the republic, and any law or act inconsistent with
its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or by neces-
sary implication in this Constitution, be of no force and effect to the
extent of the inconsistency. Consequently, a Constitutional Court de-
cision could invalidate the provisions of our criminal code.
In State v. Makwanyane,'" the accused were convicted in the Wit-
watersrand Local Division of the Supreme Court on four counts of
murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count of robbery
with aggravating circumstances. They were sentenced to death on
each of the counts of murder and to long terms of imprisonment on
the other counts. Their case came before the full bench of the Consti-
tutional Court for the determination of the constitutionality of the
death sentences imposed by the local division of the Supreme Court.
Advocate G. Bizos, who represented the South African Govern-
ment at the hearing of the matter, informed the Court that the Gov-
ernment accepted that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment and that it should be declared unconstitutional,
as it contravenes Section 11(2) of our Constitution. Also, during argu-
ment, counsel for the accused submitted that the death penalty for
murder is a cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment because it is an
affront to human dignity, is inconsistent wvith the unqualified right to
life entrenched in the Constitution, cannot be corrected in case of er-
ror or enforced in a manner that is not arbitrary, and negates the es-
sential contents of the right to life and the other rights that flow from
it.
144. 1995 (3) SA 391. For a discussion of the case, see School of Law, University of
the Witwatersrand, Annual Survey of South African Law 1995, at 6, 14-15, 25-27, 29,
31-33, 43, 86-87.
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The President of the Constitutional Court, Arthur Chaskalson, de-
livered the judgment of the Court. During the course of his judgment,
he referred to chapter 3 of our Constitution which, as stated above,
sets out the fundamental rights to which every person is entitled under
the Constitution.'45 One such right is the right to life, which the death
penalty violates.
Although no section of the Constitution specifically deals with the
death penalty, there are sections that indirectly deal with the death
penalty, such as Section 11(2), which prohibit cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment or punishment. Other sections of the Constitution,
which are of importance to the question of the constitutionality of the
death penalty, and to which the Court referred, are the following:
Section 8: "every person shall have the right to equality before the
law and to equal protection of the law."' 46
Section 9: "every person shall have the right to life."' 47
Section 10: "every person shall have the right to respect for and
protection of his or her dignity."' 48
Punishment must meet the requirements of sections 8, 9, 10, and 11
for it to be in accordance with our Constitution, and the death penalty
is a flagrant violation of the said sections.
The Court said, "Death is the most extreme form of punishment to
which a convicted criminal can be subjected. Its execution is final and
irrevocable. It puts an end not only to the right to life itself, but to all
other personal rights which had vested in the deceased under [chapter
3] of the Constitution."' 4 9 Continuing in its condemnation of the
death penalty, the Court said that the death penalty is a cruel penalty.
It is also an inhuman punishment, for it involves a denial of the exe-
cuted person's humanity, and is degrading because it strips the con-
victed person of all dignity and treats him or her as an object to be
eliminated by the State. The court further said that capital punish-
ment is imposed arbitrarily.150 It cannot be gainsaid that poverty,
race, and chance play roles in the outcome of capital offense cases and
in the final decision as to who should live and who should die.
Unjust imprisonment, which is possible, is also a great wrong, but if
discovered, the prisoner can be released and compensated. But the
killing of an innocent person is irreversible. The Court referred to
Canadian Law, German Law, and International Conventions, and
came to the conclusion that the death penalty is indeed a cruel, inhu-
mane, and degrading punishment, and that it violates the right to life,
and consequently, it is unconstitutional.
145. See 1995 (3) SA 391, paras. 100-02.
146. S. Afr. Const. § 8.
147. S. Afr. Const. § 9.
148. S. Afr. Const. § 10.
149. See 1995 (3) SA 391, para. 103.
150. See id. para. 104.
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The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human
rights, and the source of all other personal rights contained in chapter
3 of our Bill of Rights. By committing ourselves to a society founded
on the recognition of human rights, we are required to value these two
rights above all others. The Court further said that retribution cannot
be accorded the same weight under our Constitution as the rights to
life and dignity, which are the most important of all the rights con-
tained in chapter 3 of our Bill of Rights. It has not been shown that
the death sentence would be materially more effective to deter or pre-
vent murders and other more serious crimes than would be the alter-
native sentence of life imprisonment. Taking into account the
arbitrary manner in which the death penalty is imposed, the possibility
of mistake and the lack of clear evidence that the death penalty is
more effective in protecting society and deterring possible capital of-
fenders, a case has not been made for the justification of the death
penalty.
Some few years ago, I conducted a limited research project. I inter-
viewed some prisoners who were on death row. After the interviews,
it was clear to me that most people who commit serious crimes do so
under the false impression that their schemes are so good that they
will never be arrested. The question of the death penalty never came
to their minds, as they thought that they would never be arrested. If
the death penalty, which was still on our statute books at that time,
was playing any significant role in deterring would-be offenders, the
said death row offenders would not have committed the offenses for
which they were convicted.
In my opinion, life-long imprisonment without the possibility of pa-
role, coupled with sufficient and visible policing, are likely to effec-
tively protect society and deter would-be offenders, and do not have
the negative elements of the death penalty.
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